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THE RELUCTANT WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION
Inference of Defendant's Guilt Arising From a Prosecution Witness's Invocation of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Analysis and Proposal
CAROLYN JAFFE ANDREW
Mrs. Andrew is a member of the Illinois Bar. She received the LL.B. degree in 1963 from the
Northwestern University School of Law, where she is presently a candidate for the LL.M. degree
under a Ford Foundation Fellowship in Criminal Law. Mrs. Andrew has served as Abstractor of
Recent Cases for this Journal since 1961 and served as Managing Editor of the Ngorthnvestern Univer-
sity Law Review in 1962-1963. She is also conducting a project to revise the rules and regulations of
the Chicago Police Department.
When the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked by a prosecution witness whom the jury
understands to have been involved in the circumstances which gave rise to the criminal charge against
the defendant, the jury may infer the guilt of the witness and in turn the guilt of the defendant.
How can the criminal defendant protect himself against the prejudicial effects of such inferences? How
does existing law treat this problem? And how can the law be improved to insure both a fair trial
to the defendant and a fair opportunity to the prosecution to present its case? In the following article,
the author considers these questions, critically analyzing the existing law and proposing a new ap-
proach to the problem.-EDIToR.
Although the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion' "serves to protect the innocent who otherwise
might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances," 2
and the United States Supreme Court recently
condemned "the practice of imputing a sinister
meaning"3 to the exercise of this constitutional
right, it must be conceded that most laymen tend
to infer guilt from invocation of the privilege.4
The fact that motives other than concealment of
* This article is a revision of a paper originally
submitted to Professor Fred E. Inbau, in his Criminal
Evidence Seminar, Northwestern University School of
Law, March, 1963.
1 The privilege is guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment in U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, and by all the states
except Iowa and New Jersey by express state constitu-
tional provision. Iowa construes its state constitutional
due process clause as including the privilege, State v.
Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902), while New
Jersey recognizes the privilege as a common law guar-
antee, State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 At]. 743
(1903), implemented by N.J. Rzv. STAT. 2:97-7 (1937).
2 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551,
557-58 (1956).
3Id. at 557.4 "[I]n the public mind an odium surrounds the claim
of constitutional privilege by a witness in refusing to
testify on the ground that his testimony would tend to
incriminate him .... " DeGesualdo v. People, 147
Colo. 426, 432, 364 P.2d 374, 378 (1962).
guilt may be the basis for refusal to testify5 refutes
the validity of an inference of guilt; moreover,
the principles which underlie the fifth amendment
privilege demand that such an inference be pro-
hibited. 6 Since the fifth amendment applies only
to the federal government, however,7 the states
remain free to allow inferences of guilt to be drawn
from invocation of their respective versions of the
privilege against self-incrimination."
6 See Noonan, Inferences From tire Invocation of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrinination, 41 VA. L. Rxv. 311,
322 (1955), for a discussion of various motivations for
claiming the privilege.
8 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956); DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140
(5th Cir. 1962). See id. at 144-50 for an excellent and
well-documented discussion of the history and purposes
of the privilege. See also United States v. Shaughnessy,
212 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1954). Cf. People v.
Maunausau, 60 Mich. 15, 20, 26 N.W. 797, 799 (1886).
7 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 708 (1908).
8 See note 1 supra. 8 WIGmoR, EvIDENcE. §2272,
at 427 n.2 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMo0o], contains a discussion of state cases
dealing with comment on defendant's failure to testify.
Six states permit such comment: California and
Ohio by constitutional provision, Connecticut, Iowa
and New Jersey by judicial decision, and New Mexico
by rule of court. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), reaffirming the principle announced in Twining,
supra note 7, upheld California's constitutional pro-
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Since any inference of guilt regarding a person
who avails himself of his privilege against self-
incrimination is merely that-an inference-, it
seems illogical and unjust to permit a jury to infer
the guilt of a criminal defendant from the refusal
of another to testify-an inference piled upon an
inference.9 Further compounding the possible
prejudice to the defendant is the well settled rule
that the witness cannot be examined as to his
reason for claiming the privilege. 0 The defendant
therefore cannot rebut the inference of his own
guilt that the jury may draw from the witness's
invocation of his privilege. Yet some courts permit
juries to use this tenuous reasoning in criminal
cases, either by expressly allowing the "double
inference" to be drawn or by gullibly presuming
that cautionary instructions prevent its being
drawn.
It might appear that the claim of privilege
against self-incrimination by a prosecution witness
allegedly connected with the crime of which the
defendant is charged presents no problem of
prejudice to the defendant in jurisdictions which
permit the initial inference of guilt to be drawn,
inasmuch as the basis for the inference of the
defendant's guilt is the permissible inference of
the witness's guilt. However, the possibility of
prejudice to the defendant is as real in those
jurisdictions which do permit the initial inference
as in those which do not, since in both instances
the premise from which the defendant's guilt is
inferred is the mere inference that the witness
claiming his own privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is guilty.
Thus, theoretically, the problem can exist every-
vision permitting comment on defendant's failure to
explain or deny evidence against him. See Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962), for the Supreme
Court's most recent statement of the proposition that
the fifth amendment privilege does not apply to the
states as part of fourteenth amendment due process.
9 Since the witness's answer, if given, "might con-
ceivably be that he but not the defendant was guilty of
the offense, or. . . that both he and the defendant were
guilty; or it might relate entirely to some other offense,"
Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1950), or might be wholly unrelated to guilt, Noonan,
supra note 5, the witness's claim of privilege has been,
and, it seems, should be, held incompetent as evidence
of guilt of the defendant. See, e.g., Billed v. United
States, supra; Beach v. United States, 46 Fed. 754, 755
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890); Powers v. State, 75 Neb. 226,
229, 106 N.W. 332, 333 (1905). See also cases cited in
note 32 infra.
10 8 WIGMoRE §2279, at 815 n.9; Recent Decisions, 23
U. Prrr. L. REV. 813 (1962). Accord, Phelin v. Kender-
dine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853).
where in the United States. And, because of certain
practical considerations, it does everywhere exist.
The prosecution's failure to produce an accomplice
or similarly situated witness may give rise to the
inference that his testimony, if given, would have
been unfavorable to the prosecution;" conse-
quently, such witnesses are frequently called, and
often they refuse to testify.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how
courts deal with this problem, to analyze the
validity and desirability of the various approaches,
and finally, to present a therapeutic proposal.
ExrsTmo LAw
Several factors must be present before an ap-
pellate court will reverse a conviction on the ground
that a defendant's rights were prejudiced by the
prosecution's calling of a witness who invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination:
1. The witness must be so factually connected
with the defendant that the witness's claim of
privilege leads the jury to infer the defendant's
guilt;
2. The witness must have a valid right to invoke
the privilege;
3. The defendant must establish that the prose-
cution called the witness in bad faith; i.e., that
the prosecution knew or reasonably believed that
the witness would, when called, assert his privilege;
4. Timely objection must have been made; and
5. Prejudicial error, not cured by cautionary
instructions, must be found.
1. Witness's Relation to Defendant
The reason for this requirement is both logical
and clear. Absent a relationship between the wit-
ness and the defendant with regard to the trans-
action out of which grew the present criminal
charge against the defendant, a jury is unlikely
to imply the defendant's guilt from the witness's
refusal to testify on grounds that his answer would
tend to incriminate him. In light of its basis, then,
the requirement should further stipulate that the
jury must be aware of the relationship before a
reviewing court will entertain the argument that a
witness's refusal to testify prejudiced defendant's
right to a fair trial. Since the relationship naturally
precedes possibility of prejudice, defendants rarely
assign as error the calling of a witness not so re-
"McCoRmKc, EvwExcE §249 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as McColmcic; Annot., 135 A.L.R. 1375
(1941).
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lated who refuses to testify. Thus the requirement
is implicit, seldom, if ever, being overtly stated in
cases dealing with the problem.
12
The relationships most frequently appearing in the
cases are those wherein the witness is known by the jury
to have allegedly been culpably involved in the criminal
conduct with which the defendant is charged. See,
e.g., codefendant witnesses: Namet v. United States,
373 U.S. 179 (1963); United States v. Maloney, 262
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Romero, 249
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957); People v. Plyler, 121 Cal. 160,
53 Pac. 553 (1898); State v. Hogan, 145 Iowa 455, 88
N.W. 1074 (1902); State v. Addington, 158 Kan. 276,
147 P.2d 367 (1944); Davis v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky.
242, 229 S.W 1029 (1921); People v. Malloy, 204
Mich. 524, 170 N.W. 690 (1919); People v. Maunausau,
60 Mich. 15, 26 N.W. 797 (1886); State v. Greer, 321
Mo. 589, 12 S.W.2d 87 (1928); Froding v. State, 125
Neb. 322, 250 N.W. 91 (1933); Powers v. State, 75 Neb.
226, 106 N.W. 332 (1905); Washburn v. State, 164
Tex. Crim. 448, 299 SAV.2d 706 (1956); Johnson v.
State, 158 Tex. Crim. 6, 252 S.W.2d 462 (1952); Rice v.
State, 123 Tex. Crim. 326, 59 S.W.2d 119 (1933);
Rice v. State, 121 Tex. Crim. 68, 51 S.W.2d 364
(1932); co-conspirator witnesses: United States v.
Cioffi, 242 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 975
(1957); accomplice witnesses: People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.
2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940); People v. Black, 73 Cal.
App. 13, 238 Pac. 374 (1925); DeGesualdo v. People,
147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961); State v. Harper, 33
Ore. 524,55 Pac. 1075 (1899); Garland v. State, 51 Tea.
Crim. 643, 104 S.W. 898 (1907).
In a few cases, defendants have complained of
prejudice where the witnesses claiming the privilege
were not known to have been so involved. In each of
these cases, however, facts existed which connected the
witness to the defendant in such a way that, even if the
witness could not be found criminally responsible in
some degree for the crime with which the defendant was
charged, the witness's claim of privilege might never-
theless be considered by the jury as bearing on the
defendant's guilt. In United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d
605 (7th Cir. 1954), the witnesses whose refusal to
testify was complained of were men implicated in
illicit activities with the prosecutrix in a Mann Act
prosecution against defendant. Although the witnesses
were not actually involved in the commission of the
crime for which defendant was tried, the inference of
their guilt of illicit conduct with the prosecutrix, which
might be drawn from their refusals to testify, might
lead the jury to believe that defendant committed the
alleged Mann Act violation. McClure v. State, 95 Tex.
Crim. 53, 251 S.W. 1099 (1923), involved a witness
who, although unindicted, was probably an accomplice.
The witnesses whose claims of privilege were objected
to in State v. Snyder, 244 Iowa 1244, 59 N.W.2d 223
(1953), were women whom defendant was charged of
aborting. See also Beach v. United States, 46 Fed.
754 (C.CN.D. Cal. 1890).
Occasionally a defendant urges that a witness's
refusal to testify is relevant to issues in the case. In
State v. Weber, 272 Mo. 475, 199 S.W. 147 (1917), the
defendant complained not of the refusal of a prosecution
witness to testify, but of the trial court's failure to
admit as evidence a claim of privilege given at defend-
ant's preliminary hearing by a witness who, at the
time of trial, had left the jurisdiction. The defendant
unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the witness's
claim of privilege against self-incrimination to the
question whether he had had intercourse with the
2. Validity of Witness's Claim of Privilege13
The question whether a witness has a right to
invoke the privilege is decided by the trial court,1
4
and absent a valid claim, the witness can be com-
pelled to testify on pain of being held in contempt
of court for refusal to answer. A witness's prior
conviction of or plea of guilty to a crime growing
out of the transaction with regard to which the
defendant is being tried generally precludes that
witness from validly claiming his privilege, since
it is assumed that he can incriminate himself no
further."5
Appellate courts refuse to reverse on the ground
that the prosecution called such a witness, even if
he persists in refusing to testify after his claim of
privilege has been held invalid.18 Two bases for
prosecutrix prior to the date on which the defendant
was alleged to have committed statutory rape upon
her should have been admitted as evidence of her prior
unchastity, a defense to the charge against defendant.
Phrases such as "crucial relationship" and "crucially
connected" or "crucially related" witness will herein-
after be used in this paper as referring to the relation-
ship necessary to satisfy this first requirement; i.e.,
where the witness is so connected with the defendant
that an inference of the witness's guilt will lead to an
inference of the defendant's guilt.
The related problem of prejudice occasioned by
comment by the prosecution on simple failure of an
accomplice or similar person to testify is beyond the
scope of this paper. See note 34 infra.
" "Witness," as used in this paper, refers only to a
person not actually a defendant in the criminal pro-
ceeding during which he is called to the stand. A
different rule, of course, obtains with respect to a
defendant, who may not be called except at his option.
A non-defendant, though he may claim his privilege
against self-incrimination, must first be sworn, and may
be involuntarily called to the stand. McCoganc §122.
14Id. §129; 8 WIGMUORE §2271. The trial judge's
determination of this issue will be overturned on appeal
only if clearly wrong. McCoascEc §129, at 270.
"5Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963);
United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 968, rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 944
(1958); United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d
Cir. 1957); United States v. Cioffi, 242 F.2d 473 (2d
Cir.), cerl. denied, 353 U.S. 975 (1957); 8 WIGMORE
§2279. Contra, Froding v. State, 125 Neb. 322, 250
N.W. 91 (1933), where what the court perfunctorily
terms "exercise of his privilege" by a witness pre-
viously convicted on a plea of guilty of the same crime
for which defendant was on trial seems rather to be
refusal to testify absent a valid claim of privilege,
allowed by the trial court in light of the circumstances
under which the witness entered his guilty plea.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Gemie, supra note 15;
United States v. Romero, supra note 15; United States
v. Cioffi, supra note 15. But see State v. Harper, 33 Ore.
524, 55 Pac. 1075 (1899), where the court held that
comment by the prosecution on the refusal to testify of
a witness whose claim of privilege was invalid because
of prior conviction constituted reversible error, stating,
"[Tio hold otherwise is, in effect, to punish a party for
1964]
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this position have been stated, both related to
lack of bad faith by the prosecution. One basis
seems to be that the witness's lack of motive for
invoking his privilege against self-incrimination
negates the idea that the prosecution called him
solely to evoke from him the claim of privilege,
i.e., in bad faith. 7 Another is that calling the wit-
ness is justified because failure of the prosecution
to call as a witness one convicted of a crime related
to or the same as that with which the defendant is
charged would result in the inference that his
testimony, if given, would be unfavorable to the
prosecution."'
No cases relevant to the topic under discussion
were discovered wherein a witness's claim of
privilege was held invalid on grounds other than
prior conviction or guilty plea. It would appear
that where other grounds are involved, the wit-
ness's refusal to answer after an adverse ruling on
his invocation of privilege would not be prejudicial
to the defendant; the trial court's ruling would
theoretically rule out any inference of the witness's
guilt. However, the jury might construe the wit-
ness's continued refusal to answer as a subjective
determination of guilt, or, at least, of incriminating
circumstances by the witness, regardless of the
technical invalidity of his privilege claim.
3. Prosecution's Bad Faith
Appellate courts always require the defendant
to prove that the prosecutor called the witness in
"bad faith." In part, this factor is deemed essential
in order to discipline the prosecutor who became
more partisan than minister of justice.19 Most
the refusal of a witness to obey the order of a court."
Id. at 529, 55 Pac. at 1077.
1 Namet v. United States, supra note 15, at 188-89;
United States v. Cioffi, supra note 15, at 477. The bad
faith factor is discussed in the text at 4-5 & 8-11 infra.
IsSee note 11 supra. This factor seems to have
influenced the court to affirm defendant's conviction in
United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957).
While dealing with a previously convicted witness,
United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 968, rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 944
(1958), indicates that the possibility of an unfavorable
inference against the prosecution would justify calling a
witness connected with defendant's alleged crime even
if the witness retained a valid right to claim his privi-
lege.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605,
613 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Five Cases, More
or Less, Containing "Figlia Mia Brand", etc., 179 F.2d
519, 523 (2d Cir. 1950); DeGesualdo v. People, 147
Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961); McClure v. State, 95
Tex. Crim. 53, 59, 251 S.W. 1099, 1102 (1923); Garland
v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 643, 645, 104 S.W. 898, 899
(1907). But see United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d
cases, however, simply state the requirement with-
out explaining its basis. Although the requirement
of bad faith is universal, there are two irrecon-
cilable theories regarding proof of bad faith. Some
courts hold that evidence of knowledge or reason-
able cause to believe2° that the witness intended to
claim his privilege suffices,2 ' while others assert
that since the potential witness may suffer a last-
minute change of heart and decide to testify, evi-
dence that the prosecution possessed information
regarding his intention not to testify does not prove
bad faith.22
535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959), where the court suggests that
the prosecution could disclose it had reason to believe
that the witness would refuse to testify only if the
defendant first argued that the prosecution's failure to
call that witness gives rise to an inference against the
prosecution. Cf. note 33 infra.
After stating the language quoted in note 4 supra,
the Colorado Supreme Court continued, "A district
attorney, although in a sense a partisan, is a judicial
officer sworn to uphold the constitution and obligated
to refrain from invalid conduct creating an atmosphere
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant."
DeGesualdo v. People, supra note 19, at 433, 364 P.2d
at 378. The court had previously indicated, id. at 430,
364 P.2d at 377, that lack of bad faith would have
precluded reversal. In McClure v. State, supra note 19,
the court stated, "If the state's purpose... was to
compel or invite... [the witness's] refusal to testify,
in order to use this as an incriminating fact against
appellant, the state was guilty of an injustice." See
also United States v. Tucker, 267 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1959), in which the court, reversing on other grounds,
uttered the following dictum:
"[A]n interrogating official himself gravely abuses the
privilege against self-incrimination when, believing
a truthful answer will incriminate a witness, he
nevertheless insists on asking the incriminating
question with a view to eliciting a claim of privilege
and thereby creating prejudice against the witness or
some other party concerned."
Id. at 215.
20Query whether reasonable cause to believe a
potential witness will invoke his privilege should be
presumed where defendant shows that the prosecution
knew of the witness's relationship of accomplice, co-
defendant, etc., to the defendant. One court indicates
that where the witness was an accomplice, the burden of
proving good faith was on the prosecution: "[The] ...
state should not attempt to place her on the stand
unless she proposes to turn state's evidence." Garland
v. State, supra note 19. See also United States v.
Tucker, supra note 19, in which the court indicated that
bad faith existed where a witness who had claimed his
privilege at defendant's first trial was again called and
again refused to testify at the second trial, since the
prosecution had no reason to believe the witness had
changed his mind in the interim.
21 United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1959); Johnson v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 6, 252 S.W.2d
462 (1952); Rice v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 326,59 S.W.2d
119 (1933); Rice v. State, 121 Tex. Crim. 68, 51 S.W.2d
364 (1932).
22 "The fact that these witnesses previous to the
trial had asserted extrajudicially their constitutional
[I. 55
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While paying lip-service to the doctrine that
convictions should be reversed if procured by the
prosecution's calling in bad faith of a witness who
invokes his privilege against self-incrimination,
courts adhering to the latter view actually preclude
its application; for to say that knowledge of the
witness's prior manifestations of intention not to
testify does not evidence bad faith is simply to say
that bad faith cannot be proved.
Although proof of bad faith is always requisite
to reversal, it will not compel reversal in absence of
a showing that prejudicial error occurred which
was not cured. Such showing, of course, depends on
the defendant's standing to urge that calling the
witness was prejudicial error, which in part de-
pends on the scope of the reviewing court's ap-
proach to a witness's claim of privilegePn
4. Timely Objection
Timely objection to a prosecutor's calling of a
witness who claims his privilege against self-
incrimination or to a prosecutor's comment on
the witness's invocation of privilege25 is required
right to refuse to answer did not preclude the prosecu-
tion from calling them upon the trial and interrogating
them under oath ... in the hope that in the interim
they might have undergone a change of mind and be
willing... (to testify]." People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d
731, 747, 104P.2d 794, 802 (1940). See Commonwealth
v. Granito, 326 Mass. 494, 498-99, 95 N.E.2d 539,
542 (1950).
In Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330 (9th
Cir. 1950), where the prosecution had been warned by
the witness's attorney that the witness would, if called,
assert his fifth amendment privilege, the court approved
both the prosecution's subsequent calling of the witness
and continuing to question him after he initially claimed
the privilege, stating, "It is conceded that before...
[the witness] was called other witnesses who had,
before trial, threatened to refuse to testify on this
ground, nevertheless had testified without claiming any
privilege," and reasoned that the witness's uncertainty
as to whether to assert his privilege in the first place
justified the prosecution's asking of the second question,
since between his first claim and the second question,
the witness might have changed his mind.
2 While a defendant may lose standing to object by
waiver, i.e., by failure to object in an attempt to cure
prejudice and to preserve the claimed error for review,
he never has standing to object to a witness's claim of
privilege if the appellate court views the privilege
against self-incrimination as strictly personal to the
witness for all purposes. See note 31 infra and accom-
panymg text.24 See, e.g., Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179,
190 (1963); United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, 831-32
(2d Cir. 1950).
2- See, e.g., McClure v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 53, 251
S.V. 1099 (1923), where, although mere calling of the
witness in absence of bad faith was condoned, comment
by the prosecution on his claim of privilege constituted
reversible error. See note 34 infra and accompanying
text.
for reversal only if, in the appellate court's view,
any prejudice caused by the conduct complained
of is curable by cautionary instructions.26 More-
over, if the court holds the error curable, failure
to request cautionary instructions may be found
to constitute waiver.n It may be said that where
an appellate court believes, the error is curable,
failure to request cautionary instructions nullifies
the validity of an objection to the prosecutor's
conduct, even if the objection is otherwise timely.
It further seems that an objection which cannot
be reviewed on appeal for want of other conduct-
in this instance, requesting cautionary instruc-
tions--cannot be deemed "timely." Thus, from a
procedural point of view, for a reviewing court
holding such error curable to consider the de-
fendant's argument that a witness's claim of
privilege prejudiced him, the defendant must show
not only that he objected to the conduct com-
plained of, but also that he made a futile request
for cautionary instructions.
The Second Circuit,2 however, which regards
such error as curable, has held that, even absent
defendant's request for cautionary instructions
that no inference should be drawn from a co-
defendant witness's claim of privilege, the trial
court's failure to give such instructions sua sponte
is reversible error under the "plain error" rule.29
Hence, the requirement of timely objection as de-
fined above has been limited to cases where the
error is deemed curable and does not amount to
"plain error." It is probably safe to assume, how-
ever, that most courts would hold that failure to
make such timely objection to plain error con-
stitutes waiver if the error could have been cured. 0
5. Uixured Prejudicial Error
In the restrictive view of some courts, a de-
fendant cannot successfully argue that he was
26 This qualification of the requirement of timely
objection exists because, unless the error is curable by
some corrective action, objecting is futile; thus, the
reason for requiring timely objection-to cure errors
,which can be cured at the trial level-is absent.
27 Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330 (9th
Cir. 1950) (dictum).
28 United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1959).
29 Fun. R. CRIm P. 52(b).
-0 The United States Supreme Court in Namet v.
United States, 373 U.S. 179, 190-91 (1963), held that
the trial court's instruction permitting the jury to infer
defendant's guilt from the valid privilege claims of two
witnesses did not constitute plain error under Rule
52(b) where defendant did not object to the instruction.
See note 36 infra.
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prejudiced by a witness's invocation of his privilege
against self-incrimination, since use of the privilege,
being personal to the individual claiming it, can-
not be the basis of objection by another.n Most
courts, however, realizing that invocation of the
privilege, though personal to the witness, can m-
deed result in prejudice to the defendant, allow
him to complain.n They must then consider
whether the conduct of which he complains was in
fact prejudicial, and, if so, whether the prejudice
was cured by cautionary instructions.
The elements numbered 1 through 4, discussed
above, must be found before the calling of a wit-
ness who claimed his privilege against self-in-
crimination will be deemed prejudicial. Once these
requirements have been satisfied, the question is
whether the defendant's substantial rights have
been prejudiced by the occurrence. Generally,
courts fLnd such prejudice where an inference of
defendant's guilt was probably drawn from the
witness's refusal to testify on grounds of the
privilege.P If the prosecutor has not only called
These courts seem to adhere to this restrictive view
even where prejudice to the defendant is conceded.
The rationale seems to be simply that the defendant
lacks standing to object. See, e.g., People v. Plyler, 121
Cal. 160, 162, 53 Pac. 553, 554 (1898). Cf. State v.
Addington, 158 Kan. 276, 147 P.2d 367 (1944). In
State v. Snyder, 244 Iowa 1244, 59 N.W.2d 223 (1953),
defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his
motion to quash notice of additional testimony or to
strike names of certain proposed witnesses (women
whom defendant was charged of aborting), and of his
objections to the appearance of certain of these witnesses
who invoked the privilege, contending that such denial
was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. The
state and the court were advised prior to calling the
witnesses that they would do so. The Supreme Court
of Iowa misconstrued defendant's argument, stating,
"Immunity is a privilege of the witness only, and may
not be urged by the party against whom the witness is
offered." Id. at 1248, 59 N.W.2d at 226. Defendant, of
course, was not seeking to insist that one who could
assert his privilege do so-which is the only contention
satisfactorily answered by the above statement-but
rather argued that because the witnesses intended to
and did claim the privilege, the trial court's denial of
his motion and objections was reversibly prejudicial.
2 See, e.g., Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Beach v. United States, 46 Fed. 754
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890). In the latter case, the court held
that invocation of the privilege was the witness's
"constitutional right, which the defendant could not
control, and no inference should have been permitted to
be drawn against the defendant because of... [the
witness's claim]." Id. at 755. Accord, Phelin v. Kender-
dine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853).
3 "The trial court committed reversible error in
permitting the state to call... [the co-defendant] to the
stand and require him to claim his privilege against
self-incrimination and refuse to testify in the presence
of the jury. Such refusal to testify was prejudicial
the witness but also has commented on his refusal
to testify, courts more readily find -that the in-
competent evidence was considered by the jury
than if the incident has been more or less ignored."
because it could be used as an incriminating fact against
appellant." Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 448,
451, 299 S.W.2d 706, 708 (1956). "It would, indeed, be
strange doctrine that any one could be found guilty, or
even that his guilt could be seriously debated, because
another party, called as a witness,... had refused to
testify in order to protect himself." Beach v. United
States, supra note 32, at 755. See Powers v. State, 75
Neb. 226, 229, 106 N.W. 332, 333 (1905) (exercise of wit-
ness's privilege cannot "in any legal degree be consid-
ered as tending to prove the guilt" of defendant; preju-
dice because may have been so considered). In United
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959), the
court found the calling of the co-defendant witness
prejudicial to defendant, stating that, while it is
logically persuasive to infer a possible answer from the
witness's refusal to testify, refusal was not a legally
permissible basis for such inference. See Rice v. State,
123 Tex. Crim. 326, 330, 59 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1933)
(prejudicial because witness's claim of privilege could
be used as an incriminating fact against defendant);
Garland v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 643, 104 S.W. 898
(1907) (prejudicial because witness's claim of privilege
usable as a "circumstance of guilt" against defendant).
See also DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364
P.2d 374 (1961); Johnson v. State, 158 Tex. Crim.
448, 252 S.W.2d 462 (1952); Rice v. State, 121 Tex.
Crim. 68, 51 S.W.2d 364 (1932). In these cases, the
trial court's prior knowledge of the witness's intention
to claim his privilege may have contributed to the
appellate court's finding of prejudice.
Only one case was discovered in which a court not
taking the restrictive view, see note 31 supra and
accompanying text, failed to find that bad faith calling
of a witness who claimed the privilege did not con-
stitute prejudicial error. In People v. Moloy, 204
Mich. 524, 170 N.W. 690 (1919), the witness was
under indictment for the same act of adultery with
which defendant was charged. The conduct was held
not prejudicial because the witness claimed her privilege
only to part of the inquiry and denied much incrimi-
nating testimony.
m See, e.g., Billed v. United States, supra note 32;
Beach v. United States, supra note 32; People v.
Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 112 Pac. 281 (1910); McClure v.
State, 95 Tex. Crim. 53, 251 S.W. 1099 (1923).
The related issue of whether the prosecution may
comment not on a witness's refusal to testify but on
the defense's failure to call as a witness an accomplice
or similar person is beyond the scope of this paper.
Generally, such conduct is deemed prejudicial. Annot.,
5 A.L.R.2d 893, 942-44 (1949). In jurisdictions with
statutes prohibiting comment on failure of certain
classes of persons to testify, which classes do not include
a co-defendant or accomplice not himself on trial in the
proceeding during which he was not called, the comment
is held not prejudicial because not included within the
statute, which, the courts apparently presume, is
exhaustive. See, e.g., State v. Madden, 170 Iowa 230,
148 N.W. 995 (1914); State v. Hogan, 115 Iowa 455,
88 N.W. 1074 (1902); State v. Addington, 158 Kan.
276, 147 P.2d 367 (1944); State v. Jones, 137 Kan. 273,
20 P.2d 514 (1933); Davis v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky.
242, 229 S.W. 1029 (1921); State v. Greer, 321 Mo.
589, 12 S.W.2d 87 (1928).
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Further, the prosecutor's continuing to ask the
witness questions containing material tending to
incriminate the defendant after the witness has
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to
similar questions is generally held prejudicial. 35
However, if the witness in fact gave relevant, non-
privileged testimony, his exercise of valid privilege
claims to a few questions is generally found not to
be prejudicia 3 6
Should the appellate court decide that the prose-
cution's conduct in calling the witness prejudiced
defendant, the remaining issue is whether the
prejudicial error was cured by cautionary instruc-
tions.33 If cautionary instructions were not given,38
3. See, e.g., People v. B 2381ack, 73 Cal. App. 13,
Pac. 374 (1925); Commonwealth v. Granito, 326 Mass.
494, 95 N.E.2d 539 (1950); Washburn v. State, 164
Tex. Crim. 448, 299 SAV.2d 706 (1956).
26 In Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963),
the Court affirmed defendant's conviction for federal
gambling offenses over his contention that he was
prejudiced by the prosecution's calling of two co-
defendant witnesses who had pleaded guilty and exer-
cised valid privilege claims as to only a few of many
questions. The Court stated:
"The effect of these questions was minimized by the
lengthy nonprivileged testimony which the witnesses
gave.... [Tihe present case is not one ... in which
a witness' refusal to testify is the only source, or
even the cbief source, of the inference that the
witness engaged in criminal activity with the defend-
ant."
Id. at 189. See also People v. Moloy, 204 Mich. 524,
120 N.W. 690 (1919), discussed in the last paragraph of
note 33 supra.
17 In the following cases, prejudicial error was found,
but was deemed cured by cautionary instructions:
United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950);
Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330 (9th Cir.
1950); People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d
794 (1940); Commonwealth v. Granito, supra note 35.
Prejudicial error required reversal in absence of
cautionary instructions in United States v. Maloney,
262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959) (see note 28 supra and
accompanying text); Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d
394 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (denial of cautionary instruction
that no inferences should be drawn from fact that
numerous witnesses claimed privilege; trial court
allowed prosecution to argue that the inference should
be drawn that their testimony, if given, would be
unfavorable to defendant); DeGesualdo v. People, 147
Colo. 426, 430, 364 P.2d 374, 377 (1961) (dictum that
cautionary instructions would have cured the prej-
udicial error); McClure v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 53,
251 S.V. 1099 (1923) (refusal to give cautionary in-
struction re comment on accomplice's refusal to testify).
In Beach v. United States, 46 Fed. 754 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1890), the trial court not only permitted the
prosecutor to argue that a witness's claim of privilege
tended to prove defendant's guilt, but also gave an
instruction expressly allowing the jury to draw such an
inference. The trial court in People v. Black, supra
note 35, refused to give cautionary instructions and
instructed the jury that it could draw such inferences
from an accomplice's claim of privilege as it desired as
the case may justify. Both convictions were reversed.
or if they were given but did not cure the prejudice,
either because the instructions were inadequate0 9
or because the prejudice was so great that it could
not be cured," the defendant's conviction will be
reversed.
ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LAW
Analyzing the validity and desirability of cur-
rently existing approaches to the question whether
the calling of a witness who refuses to testify is
prejudicial to the defendant has been postponed
until all the factors generally viewed as essential
to reversal were examined, in order that each may
be analyzed in the light of existence of the others.
1. Witness's Relation to Defendant
No issue will be taken with this requirement,
since absent the crucial relationship between the
witness and the defendant,4' there is no reasonable
possibility that the jurors will infer defendant's
guilt from the witness's refusal to testify, even if
they do infer the witness's guilt therefrom.2
2. Validity of Witness's Claim of Privilege
This requisite for reversal is meaningful only if
the reason for reversing convictions based in part
on a witness's assertion of privilege is to preserve
the integrity and purpose of the privilege against
self-incrimination or to discipline the prosecution
for resorting to what appellate courts consider
unfair practices, rather than to insure that the trial
of the particular defendant in question was fair.4
39 See, e.g., People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 112 Pac.
281 (1910), where refusal to give a specific cautionary
instruction not to consider the prosecutor's comment on
the witness's refusal to testify constituted reversible
error, even though a general cautionary instruction to
consider only the evidence was given.40 In Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 448, 299
S.W.2d 706 (1956) (see text accompanying note 35
supra), the trial court granted defendant's request for
an instruction not to consider for any purpose questions
asked by the prosecution of an accomplice who refused
to testify, but denied his motion for mistrial. The
reviewing court found the calling and questioning of the
witness so prejudicial that only the granting of a
mistrial could have prevented defendant's substantial
rights from being prejudiced. See, e.g., Powers v. State,
75 Neb. 226, 106 N.W. 332 (1905) (rev'd although
cautionary instructions given because error too prej-
udicial thus to be cured).
41 See note 12 supra.
4The remote possibility that, absent the required
relationship, the jury will nevertheless infer defendant's
guilt from the witness's claim of privilege if they have
reason to believe that the witness does not fear in-
crimination for himself but rather seeks to protect the
defendant from incriminating testimony, will not be
considered.43 Another possible premise for the requirement is
that calling the witness is justifiable because failure to
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If it is a witness's refusal to testify that leads a
jury to infer first his guilt and next the defendant's,
then the jury, it would seem, is likely to draw this
double inference whether the trial court rules
favorably or unfavorably on his claim of privilege.
Regardless of the trial court's adverse ruling on
the technical validity of his invocation, the jury
can simply reason that the witness was aware of
circumstances which he could not reveal to the
trial court but which warranted his subjective
belief that answering the questions put to him
would tend to incriminate him. Moreover, where
the reason for denying the witness's claim of
privilege is prior conviction or plea of guilty, as is
usually the case," his refusal to testify in defiance
of a court order can be construed as consistent
either with his fear of incriminating himself of a
further crime involving the defendant, or with
his desire, to protect the defendant even though
the witness can incriminate himself no further.
Either may be prejudicial to the defendant-the
first for the same reasons that a claim of privilege
by any crucially connected witness as to questions
regarding the transaction with which he and the
defendant are connected can be prejudicial; the
second self-evidently. The mental processes that
jurors would have to use to infer defendant's guilt
from a witness's refusal to testify in absence of a
valid privilege claim are less obvious and may be
less likely to occur than when the privilege claim
is upheld; therefore, the reviewing court should
regard such a case in light of all the circumstances,
not finding prejudice so readily as where a valid
claim exists. However, since the defendant none-
theless can be prejudiced by the refusal of a
crucially related witness to testify even though
his claim of privilege was not upheld,45 such a case
should be treated the same as one involving a valid
claim of privilege, unless other principles outweigh
this consideration.
Language in some cases involving a witness's
invocation of privilege indicates that the principles
which underlie the privilege compel reversal-that
the privilege is perverted if the "double inference"
produce him could result in an inference that, had he
been called, his testimony would have been unfavorable
to the prosecution. See notes 11 & 18 supra and accom-
panying text. This element will also be discussed in the
text in the section on Proposed Solution, infra.
" See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
No cases dealing with this issue were found where
denial of a witness's claim of privilege was based on
any ground other than prior conviction or guilty plea.
45 See State v. Harper, 33 Ore. 524, 55 Pac. 1075
(1899) (more fully discussed in note 16 supra).
against defendant is drawn from a witness's claim.
46
It is submitted, however, that the prejudice re-
sulting to the particular defendant in question,
rather than preservation of the privilege, is the
actual reason for reversal. Prejudice can result from
a witness's refusal to testify in absence of a valid
privilege claim just as it can where the privilege is
available. Therefore, the actual basis of the cases
referred to is not inconsistent with reversing when
prejudice results in a given case from a witness's
refusal to testify over a court order in absence of
availability of his privilege claim.
The only remaining rationale for refusing to
reverse where the witness lacked a valid privilege
claim is that lack of validity of the claim negates
the idea that the prosecution anticipated the
witness's refusal to testify, i.e., that the prosecution
called the witness in bad faith.47 If the bad faith
requirement can be justified, the fact that absence
of a valid privilege claim negates bad faith is a
persuasive reason for retaining the requirement
that the witness have a valid claim of his privilege
against self-incrimination.
3. Prosecution's Bad Faith
There are two possible reasons for requiring the
defendant to show that the prosecutor was in bad
faith when he called to the stand the witness who
claimed his privilege: first, to discipline prosecu-
tors by reversing convictions obtained by unfair
methods, a "policy" reason; and second, to provide
a ground for finding that the defendant's trial
was rendered unfair by "state action," a "qegal"
reason. It is submitted that, regardless of the
validity of either reason, bad faith in fact can never
be shown; therefore, unless one is willing to say
that a conviction should never be reversed on the
ground that a witness's claim of privilege prej-
udiced the defendant, bad faith must not be re-
quired as a condition for reversal. Further, it will
be demonstrated that state or federal action can
be found without resting this legal conclusion on
the premise that the prosecutor acted unfairly.
As mentioned earlier, some courts virtually never
reverse for prejudice due to a witness's refusal to
testify, because under their view regarding proof
of bad faith, it can never be shown. 8 The approach
most frequently used by these courts-that a
prosecutor cannot be in bad faith because not
41 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
47 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
48 See note 22 supra and accompanying and following
text.
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until the witness in fact is sworn and claims his
privilege is there a certainty that he will in fact
do so--seems logical and persuasive. A second
and equally valid reason for stating that bad faith
cannot be shown and therefore should not be re-
quired for reversal is that, until the trial court up-
holds the validity of a witness's claim of privilege,
there is no assurance that the witness will in fact
have a privilege to rely on, regardless of how
manifest was his intention to invoke it.
49
If proof of bad faith thus should not be required,
there is no longer any valid reason for distinguish-
ing between a witness's refusal to testify after an
adverse ruling on his claim of privilege and his re-
fusal pursuant to valid invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, since either type of re-
fusal may result in prejudice to the defendant. 5w
The "State Action" Concept. A recent case
dealing with a related problem will serve to illus-
trate the proposition that state or federal action
need not be limited to affirmative conduct by the
government. In DeLuna v. United States,M de-
fendant complained of comment on his own failure
to testify, not, as would be expected, by the prose-
cutor, but rather by his co-defendant's counsel,
contending that he was denied a fair trial when
the trial court permitted such comment to be made
over his objection. Finding no case directly in
point, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that the references
complained ofP2 violated both the fifth amendment
41 See note 14 supra and accompanying text. See also
People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940),
wherein this factor, as well as the often-used reason
that the potential witnesses might change their minds,
contributed to the California Supreme Court's deter-
mination that bad faith by the prosecution had not
been shown.
t0 It is not likely, however, that refusal after adverse
ruling will cause serious prejudice to as many defendants
as will refusal on a valid claim of privilege, simply
because the reasoning leading to an inference of
defendant's guilt is much less obvious and probably
less often indulged in by juries in the former case.
Another reason is that the basis for any inference of
defendant's guilt which may be drawn in the first case
is not merely the inference of the witness's guilt, but
the fact thereof, as proved by his conviction. See note
44 supra. Therefore, just as trial courts in the first
instance and appellate courts on review manage to
weigh possibly prejudicial conduct of various types in
order to determine whether the conduct was in fact
prejudicial to a defendant, they can do so where the
alleged prejudicial event consists of a witness's refusal
to testify despite a court order to do so.
5, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
E.g., that co-defendant "was honest enough and
had courage enough to take the stand," while "you
haven't heard a word from ... [defendant]." Id. at 143.
and the federal statute allowing a criminal de-
fendant, at his option, to be a competent witness;n
and that although neither the prosecutor nor the
judge made the comments, the district judge's re-
fusal to disapprove the private attorney's conduct
and to take steps to prevent defendant from being
penalized for relying on his. constitutional right to
remain silent amounted to prohibited federal
participation in or sanction of the comments.4
Language used by the court in reaching this
result is applicable to state as well as federal
judges: 5
"The federal government.cannot wash its hands
of responsibility... from the court's inaction.
The exclusive control of the conduct of the trial
is in the hands of the presiding federal judge.
He is 'not a mere moderator, but is the governor
of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct and of determining questions of law.'56l
He has the decisive role in assuring an accused a
fair trial according to federal standards."' '
The appellate court's rationale is that, once
prejudicial conduct has taken place, the trial
court's failure to cure it amounts to governmental
action. The crucial element is that uncured pre-
judice rendered the trial unfair, regardless of the
identity of or good or bad faith of the actor. That
- 18 U.S.C. §3481 (1958) provides, in pertinent part,
that a defendant "shall, at his own request, be a com-
petent witness," but that his "failure to make such
request shall not create any presumption against him."
' "The trial judge's approval of an improper comment
and refusal to disapprove the comment and do whatever
is necessary to protect a defendant from being penalized
by relying on his constitutional right amounts, in our
opinion, to sufficient participation in the comment so
that it may be properly characterized as a violation of
the fifth amendment and section 3481." 308 F.2d at
154. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Branche v.
Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
These cases seem to stand for the proposition that where
non-state action which results in the infringement of a
constitutional right is not prevented by the state, the
state becomes responsible, via the state action concept,
for the harm occasioned by its failure to act.
Is I do not, of course, mean to imply that federal
standards are to be applied to state judges in cases
dealing with the subject of this paper. However, where
the court speaks of "a fair trial according to federal
standards," the duty imposed on a state court would
be to assure the defendant a fair trial according to
state standards, provided that such standards comply
with the sixth amendment right to a fair trial which
applies to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
56 Quoting from Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 472 (1933).
57 308 F.2d at 153.
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the conduct need not be initiated by an agent of
the government is dear:
"If comment on an accused's silence is improper
for judge and prosecutor, it is because of the
effect on the jury, not just because the comment
comes from representatives of the state."'s
's 308 F.2d at 153 (citation omitted). (Emphasis
added.) Cf. Martin v. People, 114 Colo. 120, 162 P.2d
597 (1945). Defendant had been convicted of com-
mitting an act of crime against nature with one of
several sailors who spent the night at defendant's
apartment. At the trial, the sailors testified that
defendant had given them various valuables "in con-
sideration of their promise not to reveal his alleged
conduct ... while defendant stated that the sailors had
robbed him of... [the goods]." Id. at 122, 162 P.2d
at 598. On direct examination, one of the sailors volun-
tarily exclaimed that they had previously been ac-
quitted of robbery growing out of the above transaction.
Noting that this testimony conveyed improper in-
formation which could lead to an inference that the
jury should not have considered-that they should
believe the sailors rather than the defendant because
another jury had done so-the Supreme Court of
Colorado held that failure of the trial judge to grant
defendant's motion for mistrial based on the vol-
unteered information constituted reversible error,
stating: 'There is nothing to indicate that the district
attorney promoted the witness' outburst, but that does
not detract from its damaging effect." Id. at 128, 162
P.2d at 600.
The following recent cases indicate that courts seem
increasingly to be recognizing that the real issue
presented when prejudice is alleged is whether the trial
was fair. In People v. Roof, - Cal. App. 2d -,
-_P.2d-_______ 30 Cal. Rptr. 619, 622 (Dist. Ct
App. 1963), which involved a police officer witness's
volunteered statement containing inadmissible in-
formation that defendant was implicated in other
criminal offenses, the court reversed, stating, "It is the
effect of the.., statement, not the motive behind it,
which is determinative of the question whether the
case of defendant was substantially impaired." In
State v. Green, - Iowa__, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963),
the Iowa Supreme Court found reversible error in the
prosecutor's reference in his opening statement to the
defendant's failure to take a polygraph test, stating:
"The trial court attempted to excuse the statement
and action of the county attorney by saying he
acted in good faith. This is not the measuring stick
to be used. The criterion is whether or not the
defendant was improperly and unduly prejudiced."
Id. at____ 121 N.W.2d at 92. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed a conviction based in part on un-
intentionally false testimony, stating, "The fault of the
offender [witness] may be less but the effect is the
same ... ." People v. Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355,
360, 190 N.E.2d 19, 21, 239 N.Y.S.2d 673, 677
(1963). In State v. Lea, 259 N.C. 391, 130 S.E.2d
688 (1963), the Supreme Court of North Carolina
granted a new trial on grounds of prejudice caused by
the trial judge's extensive questioning of witnesses,
stating:
"[Tlhe... judge.., did not intend to do anything
to prejudice the rights of the defendants, but it is the
probable effect or influence upon the jury.., and
not... [the judge's] motive, that determines whether
the right of the defendants to a fair trial has been
The United States Supreme Court recently used
this reasoning in reversing a state murder convic-
tion on the ground that the trial court's refusal
to grant a change of venue constituted a denial of
due process in light of the prejudice against de-
fendant generated by pre-trial television broadcast
of defendant's extra-judicial confession. The Court
held that denial of change of venue was a denial
of due process regardless of who instigated the
broadcast, stating, "the question of who originally
initiated the idea of the television interview is...
a basically irrelevant detail."'
It is submitted that this same rationale should
be applied to cases where the allegedly prejudicial
occurrence consists of refusal of a crucially con-
nected witness to testify. Once a trial judge de-
termines that a witness's refusal is prejudicial to
the defendant, he should erase the prejudice by
cautionary instructions, if they could be effective
under the circumstances, or, if not, by granting a
mistrial. Application by analogy of the doctrine
of DeLuna to the instant issue does not depend
on the fact that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is involved in both; rather, it depends on the
fact that in both types of cases-comment by a
private party on an accused's silence, and refusal
to testify by a witness crucially connected with
the accused-there is an occurrence which, the
defendant complains, may cause the jury to find
him guilty because of impermissible inferences. In
the DeLuna situation, the inference is impermissi-
ble in federal courts by virtue of the fifth amend-
ment and the implementing statute,60 not merely
because a constitutional right is involved which
would be subverted were the inference permitted,6'
but also because the drawing of inferences from a
defendant's failure to testify, which may result
from motives other than concealment of guilt,
prejudices him to the extent that his trial becomes
unfair.6
Prejudice resulting from the refusal of a witness
to testify with or without a valid claim of privilege
presumably would not occur as often as would
prejudice resulting from comment on a defendant's
failure to testify, either because the witness, though
in theory crucially related, is not so closely related
impaired to such an extent as to entitle them to a
new trial."
Id. at_ , 130 S.E.2d at 689.
" Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
60 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
6, See notes 6 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
2308 F.2d at 152, 154.
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to the defendant that the "double inference" is
likely to be indulged in, or for the reason that,
while there is a crucial relationship of which the
jury is aware, its significance with regard to the
case is not apparent to them. Nevertheless, situa-
tions do arise where a witness's refusal to testify
can have the prejudicial effect which should be
prohibited."
4. Timely Objection
The requirement of timely objection for reversal
is a fair and. reasonable one, if the prejudice is
curable." Similarly, the defendant should be re-
quired to request cautionary instructions before
his initial objection to the possibly prejudicial
conduct will be deemed timely only if an instruc-
tion would cure the prejudice.65 However, the
Second Circuit's view that, where prejudice is
curable by cautionary instructions, failure to grant
such instructions even in absence of request is
reversible as plain error,66 seems more consistent
than does the strict sequirement with the concept
that a trial judge is under a duty to insure that a
trial is fair7 and must not allow the rights of a
criminal defendant to be prejudiced by error which
affects his substantial rights, even if the defendant
neither objected to nor otherwise sought to cure
the prejudicial effects of the error.
It would appear that where the prejudice is not
curable by cautionary instructions, a defendant
should have to move for mistrial before he can be
heard to complain on appeal that he was pre-
judiced by a witness's refusal to testify,6" for even
if the prejudice cannot be erased to the extent that
the trial may fairly continue, declaration of mis-
trial can prevent the prejudicial occurrence from
leading to an unfair trial terminating in conviction,
subsequent appeal, and retrial. 69
"See discussion in text at 7-8 supra.
"See note 26 supra.
65 See note 27 supra and accompanying and following
text.11 United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1959), applying FED. R. Cans. P. 52(b).
"See text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
13 In Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 448, 299
S.W.2d 706 (1956), the defendant's request for cau-
tionary instructions to consider neither a co-defendant's
claim of privilege nor questions put to him by the
prosecution was granted, but the trial court refused to
grant his motion for mistrial, requested on the ground
that the cautionary instructions failed 'to cure the
prejudice. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that since cautionary instruc-
tions in fact could not cure the prejudice, a mistrial
should have been declared.
(9 See note 26 supra. The granting of a motion for
If bad faith were deemed irrelevant to reversal,
no objection could be made to the prosecutor's
act of calling the witness. Request for cautionary
instructions or for mistrial alone would be avail-
able. The conduct complained of on appeal, then,
would be not the calling of the witness or his re-
fusal to testify, but rather the trial court's failure
to remedy the prejudice suffered by defendant by
reason of the occurrence.
5. Uncured Prejudicial Error
"The harmless error rule has restricted applica-
bility in criminal cases. Since the defendant
holds a carefully guarded'right to have his guilt
adjudged by the jury, an appellate court should
be slow to assume that an error in the trial was
inconsequential."70
The implication of this statement is clear. The
trial court that must decide what action to take
when a defendant complains of prejudice oc-
casioned by a witness's refusal to testify, or the
appellate court that must ascertain whether the
trial court was justified in doing nothing (i.e.,
whether there was prejudice), or whether such
action as it took was effective (i.e., whether the
prejudice was cured), must determine the effect
of the occurrence complained of on the fairness of
the defendant's trial. If the effect was to present
to the jury evidence incompetent to prove the de-
fendant's guilt, but which they nevertheless might
well have considered as tending to prove his guilt,
then the occurrence was prejudicial.
An inference of the defendant's guilt is likely to
be stronger-and to occur in more cases-where
the witness's claim of privilege is upheld than
where it is denied.7' The reasons which could cause
a jury to draw the prejudicial "double inference"
may be absent in some cases involving privilege
claims held invalid due to prior conviction, but
these reasons are always present where a valid
mistrial would prevent appeal from an arguably unfair
conviction. Requiring that the motion be made would
thus serve the purpose of curing whatever is curable at
the trial level; for even if a new trial is the only way to
cure the prejudice, it is less of a burden on the judicial
system that this new trial result from declaration of a
mistrial by the trial court than from remand after
reversal by an appellate court.
70 DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 155 (5th
Cir. 1962).
71 See text at 7-8 supra. The reasoning process a
jury would have to use in order to arrive at an inference
of defendant's guilt from refusal to testify by a witness
who lacks a valid privilege claim is less likely to occur
to the jurors than is the simple "double inference"
process used where the claim is valid.
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privilege claim is exercised. Furthermore, since
prior conviction removes from the jury's collective
mind the mere inference of the witness's guilt and
replaces it with conclusive proof of guilt, an
inference of defendant's guilt is no longer an in-
ference piled upon an inference; it is now an in-
ference based on the facts that the witness is
guilty and that the witness and the defendant are
crucially related to one another. It is submitted
that the occurrence wherein the witness refuses to
testify on a valid claim of his privilege against
self-incrimination will always be prejudicial,7 2
while his refusal to testify despite an unfavorable
ruling on his claim of privilege may or may not be,
depending on all the circumstances23
To find prejudice, then, a trial or appellate court
should find (1) that the crucial relationship existed
between the witness and the defendant and was
known to the jury; and (2) that the witness was
called and refused to testify, in whole or in part,
either with or without valid claim of privilege; and
an appellate court must also find (3) that the de-
fendant attempted to cure the prejudice at the
trial level by requesting cautionary instructions
and/or moving for mistrial. The requirements of
valid claim of privilege and bad faith on the part
of the prosecution should be eliminated.
Next, if the privilege claim was valid, the court
should presume that the occurrence was preju-
dicial, and, if it is a trial court, proceed to de-
termine what action is necessary to cure the prej-
udice; or, if an appellate court, whether the trial
court's course of action adequately preserved the
defendant's right to a fair trial. If the privilege
claim was not upheld in whole or in part, the trial
or appellate court should look to all the circum-
stances and decide whether the jury might use
incompetent evidence to infer defendant's guilt;
if so, then the occurrence was prejudicial, and the
trial court and appellate court respectively should
proceed as where prejudice was presumed.
Where prejudice is found, an appellate court
should reverse only if the trial court failed to grant
cautionary instructions where the prejudice was
thus curable, or if the court failed to grant a mis-
trial where the prejudice was not curable by
7 See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The
view expressed in note 31 supra and accompanying
text is clearly wrong in the light of the foregoing dis-
cussion.
7 E.g., did the jury know of the witness's prior con-
viction? How closely connected re the transaction
giving rise to the charge against the defendant was the
witness, to the jury's knowledge?
cautionary instructions. However, it is submitted
that, although cautionary instructions may suffice
to erase the prejudicial effect of a crucially con-
nected witness's refusal to testify after his privilege
claim was held invalid, such instructions are not
likely to cure the prejudice where a valid claim
was asserted. The reason is simply that since the
inference of the defendant's guilt in the first situa-
tion is less apt to be strong, if drawn at all, in-
structions not to consider the refusal for any pur-
pose will probably avert any possible prejudice,
while in the second situation, because of the lay-
man's view of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the jury's knowledge of the crucial rela-
tionship, the inference of the defendant's guilt is so
likely to be drawn and to be strong that cautionary
instructions will probably be to no avail.
That instructions not to consider for any purpose
or to draw any inference from otherwise prejudicial
information are ineffectual has been suggested by
the United States Supreme Court: "The influence
that lurks in an opinion once formed fights de-
tachment from the mental processes of the average
man.7 4 Judge Learned Hand, as well, has com-
mented on the futility of such instructions, stating,
"[This] rec6mmendation to the jury... [is] a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
power, but anybody's." 5 Moreover, noting that
cautionary instructions are likely to place special
emphasis on the occurrence sought to be cautioned
against, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has stated: "[Ilt is doubtful whether such
admonitions are not as likely to prejudice the in-
terest[s] of the accused as to help them .... ,6
It would seem, then, that an occurrence as prej-
udicial to a defendant's rights as a crucially related
witness's valid claim of privilege cannot be cured
by cautionary instructions, since such instructions
cure substantial prejudice only in the eyes of un-
enlightened appellate courts-rarely, if ever, in
reality. Thus, the only way to vitiate a defendant's
right to a fair trial where a crucially connected
witness validly claims his privilege against self-
incrimination is for the trial court at that time to
grant a mistrial, or, if it has refused to do so, for
the appellate court to reverse and remand, the
74 Irvin v. Dowd, 367 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
7 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d
Cir. 1932). See also State v. Selle, - Mo.---,
367 S.W.2d 522, 531 (1963).
76 United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 538 (2d
Cir. 1959). Cf. State v. Selle, supra note 75, suggesting
that defense counsel's objections convince the jury that
the matter objected to is true.
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reversible error being the trial court's refusal to
declare a mistrial.
Where the appellate court decides that refusal of
a witness to testify despite invalidity of his claim
of privilege was prejudicial, however, the strength
of the inference against the defendant is not likely
to be so great that carefully worded cautionary
instructions could not have cured the prejudice.
POSSMLE SOLUTIONS
While the view that bad faith of the prosecution
need not be shown and that the requisite govern-
mental action can be found in the trial court's
failure to cure the prejudicial effect seems logically
correct and would protect the defendant from a
conviction based on the jury's consideration of in-
competent and prejudicial "evidence," the rights
of the sovereign must not be overlooked. As has
been mentioned, where a person crucially related
to the defendant with regard to the crime with
which the defendant is charged is not produced,
an inference unfavorable to the prosecution may
be drawn. 7 For this reason, the proposed view
would burden the judicial process with repeated
mistrials, appeals, and retrials, inasmuch as in a
large number of criminal cases such potential
witnesses exist, are called by the prosecution in
order to avoid the unfavorable inference, and often
in fact refuse to testify. Thus there is a direct
conflict between the prosecution's right to call
the witness to avoid the inference and the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial in which the jury
considers only competent evidence.
Use of Immunity Statutes
A possible solution is to grant immunity from
prosecution to one of several persons all culpably
involved in a single criminal transaction. This in-
dividual then could legally be compelled to testify
against his partner or partnersY? This approach
would eliminate the problem of prejudice to the
defendant, except, of course, where the immunized
witness nevertheless refused to testify although
the grant of immunity replaced his privilege against
self-incrimination. 9 It would also relieve the
7 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
78 See 8 WroGoRE §2281 for a compilation of state
immunity statutes.
7" For an immunity statute to be upheld against
state or federal constitutional attack, the immunity
granted need extend only so far as does the privilege it
seeks to replace. See generally Comment, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 561 (1962). And since the fifth amendment
does not apply to the states, the scopes of state and
prosecution of the precarious task of deciding
whether to call a witness whose likely or probable
refusal to testify might result in a mistrial or re-
versal,80 or to refrain from calling him, thus as-
suming the risk of the unfavorable inference.
However, three factors stand in the way of
effective utilization of the immunity statute device:
First, many acts simultaneously constitute crimes
in more than one jurisdiction-e.g., robbery of a
federal bank is both a state and a federal offense-
and the immunity statutes of some states operate
only where the testimony sought to be compelled
will incriminate the witness under the laws of no
sovereign other than the immunizing jurisdiction;"
second, the sovereign is interested in convicting
criminals, and the practice of granting immunity
to at least one member of every group of criminally
related offenders would be detrimental to this
policy; and third, the granting of immunity to
one person in all cases where several persons are
criminally connected with a single transaction
would result in the arbitrary singling out and
federal immunity statutes do not coincide. While
Congress can and has extended some federal immunity
statutes to grant immunity from prosecution in state
as well as federal courts on a federal pre-emption theory
[e.g., Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 18 U.S.C. §1406
(1958), held to grant immunity from state criminal
prosecution in Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507
(1960); 18 U.S.C. §3486 (Supp. I1, 1954), held to grant
immunity from state criminal prosecution in Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)], the immunity
granted by a state can extend only so far as does the
state's version of the privilege against self-incrimination;
i.e., to that state's own criminal proceedings. Feldman
v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). Hence a witness
immunized by a state, or by the federal government
under a less comprehensive immunity statute than those
above cited, may choose to be held in contempt rather
than incriminate himself under the law of jurisdictions
not covered by the scope of the particular statute under
which he was immunized.0 It is not intended here to revert to terminology
reminiscent of the bad faith requirement, abolition of
which is advocated. "Likely" or "probable" refusal to
testify goes not to the question whether the prosecution
has "reasonable grounds" to believe the witness will
refuse to testify; rather, such language refers to the
likely or probable effect that the witness's precarious
status as accomplice or the like will have on his decision
whether or not to testify. A prosecutor must take this
possibility into consideration when preparing the
strategy of his case.
81 See, e.g., ILL. CODE Cnru. PRoc. §106 (1963),
permitting the court, on motion of the State's Attorney,
to grant immunity from prosecution to a material
witness before a grand jury or in a criminal case,
unless "it reasonably appears to the court that such
testimony... would subject the witness to ... prosecu-
tion ... under the laws of another State or of the
United States." Id. §106-4. See Johnson, Organized
Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System-Part II,
54 J. CRuI. L., C. & P.S. 1, 6 (1963).
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favoring of one of these persons to the prejudice of
the others. In appears that these considerations
would prevent effective use of immunity statutes
to solve the problem.
Proposed Solution
(I) Rationale. In order to protect all the rights
involved-that of the defendant to a fair trial,
of the sovereign qu& prosecutor to avoid needless
unfavorable inferences, and of the sovereign qu.
sovereign to administer criminal justice without
an inordinate number of mistrials and reversals-,
the mechanics of any solution adopted must pre-
vent the crucially connected witness from refusing
to testify in the presence of the jury, and must
compensate by carefully drafted cautionary in-
structions against any inference against the prose-
cution that the jury might otherwise draw from
its failure to produce the witness 2 A solution
incorporating these elements would result neither
in prejudice to the defendant nor in interference
with the expedition of criminal justice by the
sovereign, since lack of prejudice to the defendant
necessarily means that no mistrials or reversals
will be occasioned by a witness's refusal to testify.
Inasmuch as the opportunity for legally significant
inferences arising from failure to produce a witness
usually results in comment by opposing counsel and
instruction by the trial court that such inferences
are permissible, it is submitted that, absent com-
ment or instruction advocating or allowing the
inference, a proper cautionary instruction against
drawing an inference unfavorable to the prosecu-
tion from its failure to call a crucially connected
witness will adequately insure that the inference
will not be drawn. Moreover, since the potential
witness generally is equally available to both the
prosecution and the defense, it seems unlikely that
the jury will reach an inference unfavorable to
either side.
In light of the distinction previously suggested,
between refusal to testify where no valid right to
exercise the privilege exists and refusal where the
privilege does obtain, with regard to the probable
strength and frequency of an inference of a criminal
defendant's guilt, it appears that only valid in-
82Just as the necessary element of a crucially
connected witness was qualified by adding the require-
ment that the jury know of the crucial relationship, so
should any cautionary instruction requirement intended
to prevent the drawing of inferences unfavorable to the
prosecution be qualified by stipulating that before such
a requirement should become operative, the jury must
be aware that a crucially connected witness exists.
vocations of privilege need always be kept from
the jury's knowledge, since prejudice due to re-
fusals to testify over a court order will often be
curable by cautionary instructions.
(2) Implementation. Certain procedures pres-
ently existing in criminal law may be drawn upon
in order to determine how this proposed solution
may be given effect. Pre-trial hearings on admis-
sibility of tangible evidencen and of confessions
provide the best analogy, since in these pro-
ceedings, as in the one here sought to be developed,
determinations are made out of the presence of
the jury as to whether proferred evidence is of
such a nature that the jury is entitled to consider
it. That courts use the existing procedures to de-
termine legal questions of admissibility on the basis
of principles of federal constitutional law,85 while
the proposed proceeding would not be a vehicle
for constitutional determinations, is of no conse-
quence for present purposes, inasmuch as the
reason for both the existing and the proposed
proceedings is to assure that, if the evidence sought
to be admitted proves inadmissible, the jury will
never know of its existence.
Some states provide that a defendant intending
to plead an afflrmative defense must file notice of
his intention to do so within a specified time before
trial or he will be estopped from urging it at the
trial."' It is suggested that, similarly, the prosecu-
tion intending to call as a witness one crucially
related to the defendant be required to file notice
to that effect. Just as the Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that the prosecution's failure
to comply with certain notice requirements regard-
ing confessions precludes their admissibility, sr so
81 E.g., ILL. CODE CRns. PROC. §114-12 (1963).
m E.g., IL. CODE CRi. PROC. §114-11 (1963).
85 The admissibility of both tangible evidence alleged
to have been illegally seized and confessions alleged to
have been coerced must be determined by state as well
as federal courts in accordance with federal constitu-
tional principles. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (tangible
evidence); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)
(confessions).
s6 See generally Epstein, Advance Nolice of Alibi, 55
J. Cpnr. L., C. & P.S.(1964). Proposed Ill. Sup. Ct.
Rules on Discovery in Crim. Cases, rule 25-2(b)
(Proposed Draft 1962), requires that notice of intention
to interpose the defense of insauity, self-defense, or
alibi be furnished to the prosecution at least 20 days
before trial. [The Proposed Supreme Court Rules are
authorized by ILL. CODE Cans. PRoc. §114-13 (1963).]
Cf. ILL. CODE CRIw. PROC. §114-9, regarding the
prosecution's duty to furnish a list of witnesses to
defendant.
87ILL. CODE CP.I. PRoC. §§114-10(a), 114-10(c)
(1963).
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should a similar provision treat the calling of a
crucially connected witness where the prosecution
has not filed notice.
Once notice has been given, the defendant should
be entitled to move for a voir dire hearing, similar
to a hearing on admissibility of evidence or con-
fessions, to determine whether or not the witness
will testify. That this procedure can serve to avert
prejudice has recently been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Namet v. United
States."' At the envisioned hearing, the witness is
actually sworn, with the prosecutor asking him
the questions he intends to put to him at the trial,
and defense counsel having a right to cross-ex-
amine. It will previously have been stipulated that
all parties will be bound by the questions asked and
answers given or not given at the hearing. If the
witness refuses to answer all questions, and the
judge upholds his claim of privilege, then the
witness should not be called at the trial."9 If the
witness answers some questions but not others,
then, whether or not.his privilege claim is held valid
as to those he does not answer, the trial judge in
- 373 U.S. 179 (1963). Although the defendant in
that case had not requested a preliminary hearing, the
Court noted that "in appropriate circumstances the
defendant may be entitled to request a preliminary
screening of the witness' testimony, outside the hearing
of the jury." Id. at 190 n.9. The Court characterized a
screening as a "curative device."
The Government in its memorandum brief stated:
"If petitioner believed that the invocation of the
privilege by the... [witnesses] would prejudice him,
he had ample means of protecting himself. He could
have requested a preliminary inquiry outside the
presence of the jury to demonstrate that the witnesses
would assert the privilege under oath and to identify
the questions to which such claims would be asserted
and theextent to which such claims would be sustained
by the trial court. In fact, the [trial] court suggested
such a procedure prior to the appearance of... [a
witness]..., but defense counsel never responded
to the suggestion. Had petitioner availed himself of
this right, there would have been no refusals to
answer in the presence of the jury and no possibility
of the prejudice claimed."
Brief of Respondent in Opposition, pp. 10-11, Namet v.
United States, supra. Counsel who argued for the
United States before the Supreme Court in Namet
has suggested that, in some circumstances, the hearing
might be requested by the Government. Letter from
Stephen J. Pollak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, to
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew, Oct. 3, 1963.
"I Such an occurrence at the trial will be prejudicial
per se, for reasons previously set forth. In its main
brief in the Namel case, the Government stated:
"[%Vlhere there are overwhelming probabilities that
the witness will claim the privilege and will be sus-
tained in his claim as to Uis entire testimony, he
ought not be called at all, or at least not called before
the jury until the matter has been explored by the
trial court."
Brief of Respondent, pp. 15-16, Namet v. United
States, supra note 88. (Emphasis in original.)
the exercise of his discretion may permit all his
testimony at the hearing to be repeated at the
trial, or may permit only those questions which
were answered at the preliminary hearing to be
asked and answered at the trial."0 If the witness
refuses to answer all the questions and his claim
of privilege is denied, then the prosecution may be
allowed to call him at the trial.9 If the witness is
not called at the trial because of the results of the
preliminary hearing, and if the jury is aware both
of the witness's existence and of his crucial rela-
tionship to the defendant, then the prosecution will
be granted an instruction at the conclusion of the
trial that, due to procedural and evidentiary rules,
"X" could not be called as a witness, and that no
inferences may be drawn against either party for
failure to call him.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the existing law indicates that two
of the factors, in absence of which a reviewing
court will not consider a defendant's contention
that refusal of a crucially connected witness to
testify rendered his trial unfair, are neither logically
sound nor relevant to the central issue of whether
the trial was fair. Elimination of these two ele-
ments-validity of the witness's claim of privilege
and bad faith on the part of the prosecution-will
certainly be a step in the right direction even if
the proposed solution is not adopted. As an alterna-
tive to the proposal, it is submitted that these two
factors no longer be required, and the question of
prejudice resulting from refusal of a witness to
testify be treated in the same manner as such
questions are decided whenever a defendant claims
that any occurrence or omission at his trial results
in the denial of his right to a fair trial.
'0 Whether any or all of the questioning should be
repeated at the trial should be left to the discretion of
the trial court. See People v. Moloy, 204 Mich. 524,
170 N.W. 690 (1919) (discussed in note 33 supra).
Considerations such as the relevance of those questions
which were answered, the probable importance the jury
will place on the answers and refusals given, the validity
of the privilege claim, and the possible prejudice to the
defendant as weighed against the probative value, if
any, of the evidence, should be taken into account by
the trial judge. See also Brief of Respondent, supra
note 89.
91 Such an occurrence may or may not be prejudicial,
depending on all the circumstances, for reasons hereto-
fore discussed. The statement in the text is predicated
on the assumption that, where the incident is not very
likely to be prejudicial to the defendant, the prosecution
should be allowed to call the witness. The trial court
should consider the factors stated in note 90 supra in
determining whether or not to permit the witness to be
called at the trial.
